Inequality in Living Standards since 1980: Income Tells Only a Small Part of the Story
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Using Heights to Trace Living Standards and Inequality in Mexico Since | SpringerLink
Attanasio ; Erich Battistin ; Mario Padula. Publisher: AEI Press , This specific ISBN edition is currently not available. View all copies of this ISBN edition:. Synopsis About this title Studies of wage and income inequality among U. Buy New Learn more about this copy. Customers who bought this item also bought. Stock Image. Published by Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Seller Rating:. F orget all that guff about a growing gap between rich and poor, says Philip Hammond. Pay no heed to Jeremy Corbyn when he talks of how he will deliver for the many not the few, Theresa May says.
The chancellor and the prime minister might not always see eye to eye, but on this at least they are in unison: income inequality is at its lowest since the mids. Buried away in the depths of the budget speech, Hammond said exactly the same. For many in the world beyond Westminster, the notion that there is less income inequality in Britain since Margaret Thatcher was in her pomp sounds unbelievable. Look at the official data, the prime minister and the chancellor would say if challenged.
It is not us saying that income inequality is at its lowest for three decades, it is the Office for National Statistics. Point proven. The government has two ways of calculating income inequality, and Hammond and May are using the one that best supports their argument. An alternative measure provided by the Department for Work and Pensions , which takes more account of what is going on at the very top of the income distribution comes up with a different conclusion: inequality is not at a year-low.
At best it is flat, but it appears to be gently rising. Inequality is measured by the Gini co-efficient, which looks at how income is divided up across the nation. For example, employer-sponsored health insurance benefits are most likely a much smaller fraction of income for the top 1 percent than for the vast majority of middle-income tax units; not including them could understate income growth in the middle of the distribution relative to growth at the top.
Because each individual source of readily available data on income distribution has different advantages and limitations, no single source illustrates all of the major trends in inequality over the past six decades or so.
The Causes of Inequality
Ideally, we would look at a comprehensive measure of income that covers a long time span, allows us to compare before- and after-tax income at different points in the income distribution, and accounts for changes in the size and composition of households. CBO data satisfy many of these criteria but only go back to and are sensitive to particular methodological choices;  the historical Census family income data series and Piketty-Saez income concentration data cover a longer time span but use less-comprehensive measures of income and do not adjust for changes in the size and composition of households.
Census family income data show that from the late s to the early s, incomes across the income distribution grew at nearly the same pace. Figure 1 shows the level of real inflation-adjusted income at several points on the distribution relative to its level.
Inequality in Living Standards since 1980: Income Tells Only a Small Part of the Story
It shows that real family income roughly doubled from the late s to the early s at the 95th percentile the level of income separating the 5 percent of families with the highest income from the remaining 95 percent , at the median the level of income separating the richer half of families from the poorer half , and at the 20th percentile the level of income separating the poorest fifth of families from the remaining 80 percent.
Then, beginning in the s, income disparities began to widen, with income growing much faster at the top of the ladder than in the middle or bottom. While the Census family income data are useful for illustrating that the widening of income inequality began in the s, other data are superior for assessing more recent trends. Census family income data show that the era of shared prosperity ended in the s and illustrate the divergence in income that has emerged since that time.
CBO data allow us to look at what has happened to comprehensive income measures since — both before and after taxes — and offer a better view of what has happened at the top of the distribution. As Figure 2 shows, from to just before the financial crisis and Great Recession , average income after transfers and taxes quadrupled for the top 1 percent of the distribution. But this appears to be a methodological anomaly.
The chart below shows that federal transfers and taxes are progressive. In , the top 20 percent of households had a smaller share of total income after transfers and taxes than before transfers and taxes, while the opposite is true for the other 80 percent of the distribution. Income is highly concentrated under either measure, however. In , the top 1 percent of households received 16 percent of income before transfers and taxes and 13 percent of income after federal transfers and taxes; the comparable figures for the bottom 80 percent of households were 47 and 54 percent, respectively.
After-tax incomes fell sharply at the top of the distribution in and but have since partially recovered.
Inequality or Living Standards: Which Matters More?
The up-and-down pattern in may reflect, in part, decisions by wealthy taxpayers to sell assets in that had increased in value since they were first purchased in order to pay taxes on those capital gains before income tax rates increased in The Piketty-Saez data discussed below, which go through , show a generally upward trend since that is consistent with this explanation. Although the average income after transfers and taxes of the top 1 percent of households remains well below its peak, the percentage increase in their average income after transfers and taxes from to was more than five times larger than that of the middle 60 percent and more than three times larger than that of the bottom fifth.
See Table 1. Trends in income before transfers and taxes look very similar. Because average tax rates have fallen for all income groups since , income before transfers and taxes grew somewhat more slowly than income after transfers and taxes from to See the box for more on the effect of transfers and taxes on income. The Piketty-Saez data put the increasing concentration of income at the top of the distribution into a longer-term historical context.
For most U.S. workers, real wages have barely budged in decades
The vast majority of the increase occurred among the top 0. The increase in income concentration since the s reversed the prior, long-term downward trend. After peaking in , the share of income held by households at the very top of the income ladder declined through the s and s.
Consistent with the shared prosperity found in the Census data on average family income, the share of income received by those at the very top changed little over the s, s, and early s. The sharp rise in income concentration at the top of the distribution since the late s was interrupted briefly by the dot-com collapse in the early s and again in with the onset of the financial crisis and deep recession. Top incomes generally have been on the rise since SCF data go back to ; the latest published data are for The SCF is based on a sample of about 6, families.
The data sources discussed in the preceding sections on income distribution are superior to the SCF for measuring income distribution, but none of those sources has comparable data for looking at the distribution of wealth. As the chart illustrates, wealth is much more concentrated than income. It should be noted that while there is considerable overlap, the top 1 percent of the income distribution does not contain the identical group of people as the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution.
The SCF data show that the top 1 percent of the income distribution received roughly a quarter of all income in , while the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution held nearly two-fifths of all wealth. Similarly, the top 10 percent of the income distribution received a little more than half of all income, while the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution held more than three-quarters of all wealth. SCF data show rising concentration of wealth for the top 1 percent, little change for the rest of the top 10 percent, and a declining share for the bottom 90 percent.
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In particular, the share of wealth held by the top 1 percent rose from just under 30 percent in to While the SCF is invaluable, it has its limitations, especially for detecting trends in wealth concentration at the very top. Recently, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman have used tax-return information on income derived from wealth to infer the underlying distribution of wealth over time. As with income, these data show a long historical decline in the concentration of wealth from the late s into the late s. Concentration at the top has increased markedly since then, driven by a rising share of wealth at the very top.
The official U.
Each family or unrelated individual in the population is assigned a money income threshold based on the size of his or her family and age of its members. The poverty thresholds are adjusted each year to reflect changes in the consumer price index. The poverty rate is the percentage of people living in poverty.
The official poverty statistics show a sharp decline in the poverty rate between and but little real change since then, apart from fluctuations due to the business cycle. For a number of reasons, however, the official measure is an unreliable guide to trends in poverty since and significantly understates progress in reducing poverty since then. The official poverty measure is based on Census money income, which includes cash assistance but does not count non-cash assistance like SNAP formerly known as food stamps and rental vouchers.
Over the years, researchers have raised a number of serious conceptual and measurement concerns about how the official poverty rate is calculated. NAS-based measures use a more complete definition of income that includes the value of non-cash benefits and tax credits while subtracting taxes and certain expenses.
The NAS also recommended using a modernized poverty line that varies with local housing costs. This measure reflects recommendations from a federal interagency technical working group that drew on the NAS report and subsequent research. The Census SPM is available from to Unlike in the official poverty measure and most previous implementations of the NAS measure , unmarried partners are counted in the same SPM family.
See Figure 6.